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Abstract
Learners that are exposed to the same train-
ing data might generalize differently due to
differing inductive biases. In neural net-
work models, inductive biases could in the-
ory arise from any aspect of the model archi-
tecture. We investigate which architectural
factors affect the generalization behavior of
neural sequence-to-sequence models trained
on two syntactic tasks, English question for-
mation and English tense reinflection. For
both tasks, the training set is consistent with
a generalization based on hierarchical struc-
ture and a generalization based on linear or-
der. All architectural factors that we in-
vestigated qualitatively affected how models
generalized, including factors with no clear
connection to hierarchical structure. For ex-
ample, LSTMs and GRUs displayed qual-
itatively different inductive biases. How-
ever, the only factor that consistently con-
tributed a hierarchical bias across tasks was
the use of a tree-structured model rather than
a model with sequential recurrence, suggest-
ing that human-like syntactic generalization
requires architectural syntactic structure.
1 Introduction
Any finite training set is consistent with multiple
generalizations. Therefore, the way that a learner
generalizes to unseen examples depends not only
on the training data but also on properties of the
learner. Suppose a learner is told that a blue trian-
gle is an example of a blick. A learner preferring
shape-based generalizations would conclude that
blick means “triangle,” while a learner preferring
color-based generalizations would conclude that
blick means “blue object” (Landau et al., 1988).
Factors that guide a learner to choose one general-
ization over another are called inductive biases.
What properties of a learner cause it to have a
particular inductive bias? We investigate this ques-
tion with respect to sequence-to-sequence neural
MOVE-MAIN: Move
the main verb’s
auxiliary to the front
of the sentence.
does
the zebra
does chuckle
MOVE-FIRST: Move
the linearly first
auxiliary to the front
of the sentence.
does the zebra does chuckle
Figure 1: Two potential rules for English question
formation.
networks (Botvinick and Plaut, 2006; Sutskever
et al., 2014). As a test case for studying differ-
ences in how models generalize, we use the syn-
tactic task of English question formation, such
as transforming (1a) into (1b):
(1) a. The zebra does chuckle.
b. Does the zebra chuckle?
Following Chomsky’s (1980) empirical claims
about children’s linguistic input, we constrain
our training set to be consistent with two pos-
sible rules illustrated in Figure 1: MOVE-MAIN
(a rule based on hierarchical syntactic structure)
and MOVE-FIRST (a rule based on linear order).
We then evaluate each trained model on examples
where the rules make different predictions, such as
(2): given (2a), MOVE-MAIN would generate (2b)
while MOVE-FIRST would generate (2c):
(2) a. Your zebras that don’t dance do chuckle.
b. Do your zebras that don’t dance chuckle?
c. Don’t your zebras that dance do chuckle?
Since no such examples appear in the training set,
a model’s behavior on them reveals which rule the
model is biased toward. This task allows us to
study a particular bias, namely a bias for hierarchi-
cal generalization, which is important for models
of language because it has been argued to underlie
human language acquisition (Chomsky, 1965).
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To test which models have a hierarchical bias,
we use the question formation task and a sec-
ond task: tense reinflection. For both tasks, our
training set is ambiguous between a hierarchical
generalization and a linear generalization. If a
model chooses the hierarchical generalization for
only one task, this preference is likely due to task-
specific factors rather than a general hierarchical
bias. On the other hand, a consistent preference
for hierarchical generalizations across tasks would
provide converging evidence that a model has a hi-
erarchical bias.
We find that all the factors we tested can qualita-
tively affect how a model generalizes on the ques-
tion formation task. These factors are the type of
recurrent unit, the type of attention, and the choice
of sequential vs. tree-based model structure. Even
though all these factors affected the model’s deci-
sion between MOVE-MAIN and MOVE-FIRST, only
the use of a tree-based model can be said to impart
a hierarchical bias, since this was the only model
type that chose a hierarchical generalization across
both of our tasks. Specific findings that support
these general conclusions include:
• Generalization behavior is profoundly af-
fected by the type of recurrent unit and the
type of attention, and also by the interactions
between these factors.
• LSTMs and GRUs have qualitatively differ-
ent inductive biases. The difference appears
at least partly due to the fact that the values
in GRU hidden states are bounded within a
particular interval (Weiss et al., 2018).
• Only a model built around the correct tree
structure displayed a robust hierarchical bias
across tasks. Sequentially-structured models
failed to generalize hierarchically even when
the input contained explicit marking of each
sentence’s hierarchical structure.
Overall, we conclude that many factors can qual-
itatively affect a model’s inductive biases, but
human-like syntactic generalization may require
specific types of high-level structure, at least when
learning from text alone.
2 The question formation task
2.1 Background
The classic discussion of the acquisition of En-
glish question formation begins with two empir-
ical claims: (i) disambiguating examples such as
(2) rarely occur in a child’s linguistic input, but (ii)
all learners of English nevertheless acquire MOVE-
MAIN rather than MOVE-FIRST. Chomsky (1965,
1980) uses these points to argue that humans must
have an innate bias toward learning syntactic rules
that are based on hierarchy rather than linear order
(this argument is known as the argument from the
poverty of the stimulus).
There has been a long debate about this line of
argument. Though some have discussed the va-
lidity of Chomsky’s empirical claims (Crain and
Nakayama, 1987; Ambridge et al., 2008; Pul-
lum and Scholz, 2002; Legate and Yang, 2002),
most of the debate has been about which mech-
anisms could explain the preference for MOVE-
MAIN. These mechanisms include an assumption
of substitutability (Clark and Eyraud, 2007), a bias
for simplicity (Perfors et al., 2011), exploitation of
statistical patterns (Lewis and Elman, 2001; Re-
ali and Christiansen, 2005), and semantic knowl-
edge (Fitz and Chang, 2017); see Clark and Lap-
pin (2010) for in-depth discussion.
These past works focus on the content of the
bias that favors MOVE-MAIN (i.e., which types of
generalizations the bias supports), but we instead
focus on the source of this bias (i.e., which factors
of the learner give rise to the bias). In the book
Rethinking Innateness, Elman et al. (1998) argue
that innate biases in humans must arise from ar-
chitectural constraints on the neural connections
in the brain rather than from constraints stated at
the symbolic level, under the assumption that sym-
bolic constraints are unlikely to be specified in the
genome. Here we use artificial neural networks to
investigate whether syntactic inductive biases can
emerge from architectural constraints.
2.2 Framing of the task
Following Frank and Mathis (2007) and McCoy
et al. (2018), we train models to take a declar-
ative sentence as input and to either output the
same sentence unchanged, or transform that sen-
tence into a question. The sentences were gener-
ated from a context-free grammar containing only
the sentence types shown in Figure 2 and using
a 75-word vocabulary; the full grammar is at the
project website.3 The different types of sentences
vary in the linear position of the main auxiliary,
such that a model cannot identify the main auxil-
iary with a simple positional heuristic. The task to
T Training set, validation set, test set T Generalization set
DECL QUEST
No RC the newts do see my yak by the zebra .
→ the newts do see my yak by the zebra .
the newts do see my yak by the zebra .
→ do the newts see my yak by the zebra ?
RC on
object
the newts do see my yak who does fly .
→ the newts do see my yak who does fly .
the newts do see my yak who does fly .
→ do the newts see my yak who does fly ?
RC on
subject
the newts who don’t fly do see my yak .
→ the newts who don’t fly do see my yak .
the newts who don’t fly do see my yak .
→ do the newts who don’t fly see my yak ?
Figure 2: The difference between the training set and generalization set. To save space, this table uses
some words not present in the vocabulary used to generate the examples. RC stands for “relative clause.”
be performed is indicated by the final input token,
as in (3) and (4):
(3) a. Input: your zebra does read . DECL
b. Output: your zebra does read .
(4) a. Input: your zebra does read . QUEST
b. Output: does your zebra read ?
During training, all question formation exam-
ples are consistent with both MOVE-FIRST and
MOVE-MAIN, such that there is no direct evidence
favoring one rule over the other (see Figure 2).
To assess how models generalize, we evaluate
them on a generalization set consisting of exam-
ples where MOVE-MAIN and MOVE-FIRST make
different predictions due to the presence of a rela-
tive clause on the subject (see sentence (2a)).
2.3 Evaluation metrics
We focus on two metrics. The first is full-sentence
accuracy on the test set. That is, for examples
drawn from the same distribution as the training
set, does the model get the output exactly right?
For testing generalization to the withheld exam-
ple type, a natural metric would be full-sentence
accuracy on the generalization set. However, in
preliminary experiments we found that most mod-
els rarely produced the exact output predicted by
either MOVE-MAIN or MOVE-FIRST, as they tend
to truncate the output, confuse similar words, and
make other extraneous errors. To abstract away
from such errors, we use first-word accuracy on
the generalization set. With both MOVE-FIRST
and MOVE-MAIN, the first word of the question
is the auxiliary that has been moved from within
the sentence. If the auxiliaries in the relative and
main clauses are distinct, this word alone is suffi-
cient to differentiate the two rules. For example,
in the bottom right cell of Figure 2, MOVE-MAIN
predicts having do at the start, while MOVE-FIRST
predicts don’t.1 Models almost always produced
either the main auxiliary or the first auxiliary as the
first word of the output (over 98% of the time for
most models2), so a low first-word accuracy can be
interpreted as high consistency with MOVE-FIRST.
2.4 Architecture
We used the sequence-to-sequence architecture in
Figure 3 (Sutskever et al., 2014). This model con-
sists of two neural networks: the encoder and the
decoder. The encoder is fed the input sentence
one word at a time; after each word, the encoder
updates its hidden state, a vector representation of
the information encountered so far. After the en-
coder has been fed the entire input, its final hidden
state (E6 in Figure 3) is fed to the decoder, which
generates an output sequence one word at a time
based on its own hidden state, which is updated af-
ter each output word. The weights that the encoder
and decoder use to update their hidden states and
generate outputs are learned via gradient descent;
for more details, see Appendix A.
2.5 Overview of experiments
Holding the task constant, we first varied two as-
pects of the architecture that have no clear connec-
tion to question formation, namely the recurrent
unit and the type of attention; both of these aspects
have been central to major advances in natural lan-
guage processing (Sundermeyer et al., 2012; Bah-
danau et al., 2015), so we investigate them here
to see whether their contributions might be par-
1We exclude from the generalization set cases where the
two auxiliaries are the same. We also exclude cases where
one auxiliary is singular and the other plural so that a model
cannot succeed by using heuristics based on the grammatical
number of the subject.
2The one exception is noted in the caption to Figure 4.
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Figure 3: Sequential sequence-to-sequence model.
! ! !
SRN 0.00 0.93 1.00
GRU 0.88 0.77 1.00
LSTM 0.94 0.98 1.00
(a) Full-sentence accuracy on the test set
! ! !
SRN 0.43 0.64
GRU 0.01 0.78 0.17
LSTM 0.02 0.05 0.01
(b) First-word accuracy on the generalization set
Figure 4: Results for each combination of recurrent unit and attention type. All numbers are medians
over 100 initializations. ! = no attention; ! = location-based attention; ! = content-based attention.
A grayed-out cell indicates that the architecture scored below 50% on the test set. In (b), the SRN !
produced the first auxiliary 45% of the time; for all other models, the proportion of first-auxiliary outputs
is almost exactly one minus the first-word accuracy (i.e., the proportion of main-auxiliary outputs).
tially explained by linguistically-relevant induc-
tive biases that they impart. We also tested a more
clearly task-relevant modification of the architec-
ture, namely the use of tree-based models rather
than the sequential structure in Figure 3.3
3 Recurrent unit and attention
3.1 Recurrent unit
The recurrent unit is the component that updates
the hidden state after each word for the encoder
and decoder. We used three types of recurrent
units: simple recurrent networks (SRNs; Elman,
1990), gated recurrent units (GRUs; Cho et al.,
2014), and long short-term memory (LSTM) units
(Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997). In SRNs
and GRUs, the hidden state is represented by a sin-
gle vector, while LSTMs use two vectors (the hid-
den state and the cell state). In addition, GRUs and
LSTMs both use gates, which control what infor-
mation is retained across time steps, while SRNs
do not; GRUs and LSTMs differ from each other
in the number and types of gates they use.
3.2 Attention
In the basic model in Figure 3, the final hidden
state of the encoder is the decoder’s only source of
3Our code is at github.com/tommccoy1/
rnn-hierarchical-biases. Results for the over 3500
models trained for this paper, with example outputs, are at
rtmccoy.com/rnn_hierarchical_biases.html;
only aggregate (median) results are reported in this paper.
information about the input. To avoid having such
a bottleneck, many contemporary sequence-to-
sequence models use attention (Bahdanau et al.,
2015), a feature that enables the decoder to con-
sider all encoder hidden states (E0 through E6 in
Figure 3) when generating hidden state Di. A
model without attention has the only inputs to Di
being Di−1 and yi−1 (the previous output); atten-
tion adds a third input, ci =
∑
j αi[j]Ej , which is
a weighted sum of the encoder’s hidden states (E0
through En) using a weight vector αi whose jth
element is denoted by αi[j].
Implementations of attention vary in how the
weights αi[j] are derived (Graves et al., 2014; Lu-
ong et al., 2015; Chorowski et al., 2015). Atten-
tion can be solely location-based, where each αi
is determined solely from Di−1 (and potentially
also yi−1), so that the model chooses where to
attend without first checking what it is attending
to. Alternately, attention could be content-based,
in which case each αi[j] is determined from both
Di−1 and Ej , such that the model does consider
what it might attend to before attending to it. We
test both location-based and content-based atten-
tion, and we also test models without attention.
3.3 Results
We trained models with all nine possible combina-
tions of recurrent unit and attention type, using the
hyperparameters and training procedure described
in Appendix A. The results are in Figure 4.
Unsquashed Squashed
GRU ! 0.99 0.77
LSTM ! 0.98 0.98
(a) Full-sentence accuracy on the test set
Unsquashed Squashed
GRU ! 0.54 0.78
LSTM ! 0.05 0.43
(b) First-word accuracy on the generalization set
Figure 5: Effects of squashing. All numbers are medians across 100 initializations. The standard versions
of the architectures are the squashed GRU and the unsquashed LSTM.
The SRN without attention failed on the test
set, mainly because it often confused words that
had the same part of speech, a known weakness
of SRNs (Frank and Mathis, 2007). Therefore,
its generalization set behavior is uninformative.
The other architectures performed strongly on the
test set (> 50% full-sentence accuracy), so we
now consider their generalization set performance.
The GRU with location-based attention and the
SRN with content-based attention both preferred
MOVE-MAIN, while the remaining architectures
preferred MOVE-FIRST.4 These results suggest
that both the recurrent unit and the type of atten-
tion can qualitatively affect a model’s inductive bi-
ases. Moreover, the interactions of these factors
can have drastic effects: with SRNs, content-based
attention led to behavior consistent with MOVE-
MAIN while location-based attention led to behav-
ior consistent with MOVE-FIRST; these types of at-
tention had opposite effects with GRUs.
3.4 Differences between LSTMs and GRUs
One striking result in Figure 4 is that LSTMs and
GRUs display qualitative differences, even though
the two architectures are often viewed as inter-
changeable and achieve similar performance in ap-
plied tasks (Chung et al., 2014). One difference
between LSTMs and GRUs is that a squashing
function is applied to the hidden state of a GRU
to keep its values within the range (−1, 1), while
the cell state of an LSTM is not bounded. Weiss
et al. (2018) demonstrate that such squashing leads
to a qualitative difference in how well these mod-
els generalize counting behavior. Such squashing
may also explain the qualitative differences that
we observe: counting the input elements is equiv-
alent to keeping track of their linear positions, so
we might expect that a tendency to count would
make the linear generalization more accessible.
To test whether squashing increases a model’s
preference for MOVE-MAIN, we created a modi-
4We say that a model preferred generalization A over gen-
eralization B if it behaved more consistently with A than B.
fied LSTM that included squashing in the calcula-
tion of its cell state, and a modified GRU that did
not have the squashing usually present in GRUs.
See Appendix B for more details. Using the same
training setup as before, we trained models with
these modified recurrent units and with location-
based attention. LSTMs and GRUs with squash-
ing chose MOVE-MAIN more often than the cor-
responding models without squashing (Figure 5),
suggesting that such squashing is one factor that
causes GRUs to behave differently than LSTMs.
3.5 Hyperparameters and random seed
In addition to variation across architectures, we
also observed considerable variation across multi-
ple instances of the same architecture that differed
only in random seed; the random seeds determined
both the initial weights of each model and the or-
der in which training examples were sampled. For
example, the generalization set first-word accu-
racy for SRNs with content-based attention ranged
from 0.17 to 0.90. Based on our exploration of hy-
perparameters, it also appears that the learning rate
and hidden size can qualitatively affect generaliza-
tion. The effects of these details are difficult to in-
terpret systematically, and we leave the character-
ization of their effects for future work. Results for
all individual re-runs are at the project website.3
4 Tree models
So far we have tested whether properties that are
not interpretably related to hierarchical structure
nevertheless affect how a model generalizes on a
syntactic task. We now turn to a related but op-
posite question: when a model’s design is meant
to give it a hierarchical inductive bias, does this
design succeed at giving the model this bias?
4.1 Tree model that learns implicit structure
The first hierarchical model that we test is the Or-
dered Neurons LSTM (ON-LSTM; Shen et al.,
2019). This model is not given the tree structure
of each sentence as part of its input. Instead, its
your zebra giggledoes
E4
your zebra does giggle
E2 .
E3 QUEST
E1E0
D0
D2D1
?D3
D4
D5 D6 D7 D8
Figure 6: Sequence-to-sequence network with a
tree-based encoder and tree-based decoder.
processing is structured in a way that leads to the
implicit construction of a soft parse tree. This im-
plicit tree structure is created by imposing a stack-
like constraint on the updates to the values in the
cell state of an LSTM: the degree to which the ith
value is updated must always be less than or equal
to the degree to which the jth value is updated for
all j ≤ i. This hierarchy of cell-state values adds
an implicit tree structure to the model, where each
level in the tree is defined by a soft depth in the
cell state to which that level extends.
We re-implemented the ON-LSTM and trained
100 instances of it using the hyperparameters
specified in Appendix A. This model achieved a
test set full-sentence accuracy of 0.93 but a gener-
alization set first-word accuracy of 0.05, showing
a strong preference for MOVE-FIRST over MOVE-
MAIN, contrary to what one would expect from
a model with a hierarchical inductive bias. This
lack of hierarchical behavior might be explained
by Dyer et al.’s (2019) finding that ON-LSTMs do
not perform much better than standard LSTMs at
implicitly recovering hierarchical structure, even
though ON-LSTMs (but not standard LSTMs)
were designed in a way intended to impart a hi-
erarchical bias. According to Dyer et al., the
ON-LSTM’s apparent success reported in Shen
et al. (2019) was largely due to the method used
to analyze the model rather than the model itself.
4.2 Tree models given explicit structure
The ON-LSTM results show that hierarchically
structured processing alone is not sufficient to in-
duce a bias for MOVE-MAIN, suggesting that con-
straints on which trees are used may also be nec-
essary. We therefore tested a second type of hier-
archical model, namely Tree-RNNs, that were ex-
plicitly fed the correct parse tree. Parse trees can
be used to guide the encoder, the decoder, or both;
Figure 6 shows a model where both the encoder
and decoder are tree-based. For the tree-based
encoder, we use the Tree-GRU from Chen et al.
(2017). This model composes the vector represen-
tations for a pair of sister nodes to generate a vec-
tor representing their parent. It performs this com-
position bottom-up, starting with the word embed-
dings at the leaves and ending with a single vector
representing the root (E4 in Figure 6); this vector
acts as the encoding of the input. For the tree-
based decoder, we use a model based on the Tree-
LSTM decoder from Chen et al. (2018), but using
a GRU instead of an LSTM, for consistency with
the tree encoder. This tree decoder is the mirror
image of the tree encoder: starting with the vector
representation of the root node (D0 in Figure 6),
it takes the vector representation of a parent node
and outputs two vectors, one for the left child and
one for the right child, until it reaches a leaf node,
where it outputs a word. We test models with a
tree-based encoder and sequential decoder, a se-
quential encoder and tree-based decoder, or a tree-
based encoder and tree-based decoder, all without
attention; we investigate these variations to deter-
mine whether hierarchical generalization is deter-
mined by the encoder, the decoder, or both.
The results for these models are in Figure 7,
along with the previous results of the fully se-
quential GRU (sequential encoder + sequential
decoder) without attention for comparison. The
model with a tree-based encoder and sequential
decoder preferred MOVE-FIRST, like the fully se-
quential model. Only the models with a tree-
based decoder preferred MOVE-MAIN, consistent
with the finding of McCoy et al. (2019) that it is
the decoder that determines an encoder-decoder
model’s representations. However, the model with
a sequential encoder and a tree decoder failed
on the test set, so the only model that both suc-
ceeded on the test set and showed a bias toward
a MOVE-MAIN generalization was the fully tree-
based model (Tree/Tree).5 The behavior of this
Tree/Tree model was striking in another way as
5We do not have an explanation for the failure of the se-
quential/tree model on the test set; most of its errors involved
confusion among words that had the same part of speech (e.g.
generating my instead of your).
Model Full-sentence
test acc.
First-word
gen. acc.
Sequential/Sequential 0.88 0.03
Sequential/Tree 0.00 0.90
Tree/Sequential 0.96 0.13
Tree/Tree 0.96 0.99
Figure 7: Results with tree-based models (medi-
ans over 100 initializations). Model names indi-
cate encoder/decoder; e.g., Sequential/Tree has a
sequential GRU encoder and a tree-GRU decoder.
well: Its generalization set full-sentence accuracy
was 69%, while all other models—even those that
achieved high first-word accuracy on the gener-
alization set—had close to 0% generalization set
full-sentence accuracy. The ON-LSTM and Tree-
GRU results show that an architecture designed to
have a certain inductive bias might, but will not
necessarily, display the intended bias.
5 Tense reinflection
We have shown that several models reliably pre-
ferred MOVE-MAIN over MOVE-FIRST. However,
this behavior alone does not necessarily mean that
these models have a hierarchical bias, because a
preference for MOVE-MAIN might arise not from
a hierarchical bias but rather from some task-
specific factors such as the prevalence of certain
n-grams (Kam et al., 2008; Berwick et al., 2011).
A true hierarchical bias would lead a model to
adopt hierarchical generalizations across training
tasks; by contrast, we hypothesize that other fac-
tors (such as a bias for focusing on n-gram statis-
tics) will be more sensitive to details of the task
and will thus be unlikely to consistently produce
hierarchical preferences. To test the robustness of
the hierarchical preferences of our models, then,
we introduce a second task, tense reinflection.
5.1 Reinflection task
The reinflection task uses English subject-verb
agreement to illuminate a model’s syntactic gener-
alizations (Linzen et al., 2016). The model is fed a
past-tense English sentence as input. It must then
output that sentence either unchanged or trans-
formed to the present tense, with the final word
of the input indicating the task to be performed:
(5) my yak swam . PAST→ my yak swam .
(6) my yak swam . PRESENT→ my yak swims .
Because the past tense in English does not in-
flect for number (e.g., the past tense of swim is
swam whether the subject is singular or plural),
the model must determine from context whether
each verb being turned to present tense should be
singular or plural. Example (6) is consistent with
two salient rules for determining which aspects of
the context are relevant:
(7) AGREE-SUBJECT: Each verb should agree
with its hierarchically-determined subject.
(8) AGREE-RECENT: Each verb should agree
with the linearly most recent noun.
Though these rules make the same prediction for
(6), they make different predictions for other ex-
amples, such as (9a), for which AGREE-SUBJECT
predicts (9b) while AGREE-RECENT predicts (9c):
(9) a. my zebra by the yaks swam . PRESENT
b. my zebra by the yaks swims .
c. my zebra by the yaks swim .
Similar to the setup for the question forma-
tion experiments, we trained models on examples
for which AGREE-SUBJECT and AGREE-RECENT
made the same predictions and evaluated the
trained models on examples where the rules make
different predictions. We ran this experiment with
all 9 sequential models ([SRN, GRU, LSTM] x [no
attention, location-based attention, content-based
attention]), the ON-LSTM, and the model with
a tree-based encoder and tree-based decoder that
were provided the correct parse trees, using the hy-
perparameters in Appendix A. The example sen-
tences were generated using the same context-free
grammar used for the question formation task, ex-
cept with inflected verbs instead of auxiliary/verb
bigrams (e.g., reads instead of does read). We
evaluated these models on the full-sentence accu-
racy on the test set and also main-verb accuracy
for the generalization set—that is, the proportion
of generalization set examples for which the main
verb was correctly predicted, such as when swims
rather than swim was chosen in the output for (9a).
Models usually chose the correct lemma for the
main verb (at least 87% of the time for all tense re-
inflection models), with most main verb errors in-
volving the correct verb but with incorrect inflec-
tion (i.e., being singular instead of plural, or vice
versa). Thus, a low main-verb accuracy can be in-
terpreted as consistency with AGREE-RECENT.
Model Full-sentence
test acc.
Main-verb
gen. acc.
SRN ! 0.00
SRN ! 1.00 0.00
SRN! 1.00 0.00
GRU ! 0.90 0.04
GRU ! 0.81 0.00
GRU! 1.00 0.00
LSTM ! 0.96 0.04
LSTM ! 0.98 0.00
LSTM! 1.00 0.00
ON-LSTM ! 0.95 0.05
Tree/Tree ! 0.96 0.94
Figure 8: Reinflection results (medians over 100
initializations). ! = no attention; ! = location-
based attention;! = content-based attention.
All sequential models, even the ones that gen-
eralized hierarchically with question formation,
overwhelmingly chose AGREE-RECENT for this
reinflection task (Figure 8), consistent with the
results of a similar experiment done by Ravfo-
gel et al. (2019). The ON-LSTM also preferred
AGREE-RECENT. By contrast, the fully tree-based
model preferred the hierarchical generalization
AGREE-SUBJECT. Thus, although the question
formation experiments showed qualitative differ-
ences in sequential models’ inductive biases, this
experiment shows that those differences cannot be
explained by positing that there is a general hi-
erarchical bias in some of our sequential models.
What the relevant bias for these models is remains
unclear; we only claim to show that it is not a hier-
archical bias. Overall, the model with both a tree-
based encoder and a tree-based decoder is the only
model we tested that plausibly has a generic hi-
erarchical bias, as it is the only one that behaved
consistently with such a bias across both tasks.
6 Are tree models constrained to
generalize hierarchically?
It may seem that the tree-based models are con-
strained by their structure to make only hierar-
chical generalizations, rendering their hierarchi-
cal generalization trivial. In this section, we test
whether they are in fact constrained in this way,
and similarly whether sequential models are con-
strained to make only linear generalizations. Ear-
lier, the training sets for our two tasks were am-
biguous between two generalizations, but we now
used training sets that unambiguously supported
either a linear transformation or a hierarchical
transformation.6 For example, we used a MOVE-
MAIN training set that included some examples
like (10a), while the MOVE-FIRST training set in-
cluded some examples like (10b):
(10) a. my yaks that do read don’t giggle . QUEST
→ don’t my yaks that do read giggle ?
b. my yaks that do read don’t giggle . QUEST
→ do my yaks that read don’t giggle ?
Similarly, for the tense reinflection task, we cre-
ated an AGREE-SUBJECT training set and an
AGREE-RECENT training set. For each of these
four training sets, we trained 100 sequential GRUs
and 100 Tree/Tree GRUs, all without attention.
Each model learned to perform linear and
hierarchical transformations with similar accu-
racy: On the MOVE-MAIN and MOVE-FIRST
datasets, both the sequential and tree-based mod-
els achieved 100% first-word accuracy. On
both the AGREE-SUBJECT and AGREE-RECENT
datasets, the sequential model achieved 91%
main-verb accuracy and the tree-based model
achieved 99% main-verb accuracy. Thus, the fact
that the tree-based model preferred hierarchical
generalizations when the training set was ambigu-
ous arose not from any constraint imposed by the
tree structure but rather from the model’s induc-
tive biases—biases that can be overridden given
appropriate training data.
7 Tree structure vs. tree information
Our sequential and tree-based models differ not
only in structure but also in the information they
have been provided: the tree-based models have
been given correct parse trees for their input and
output sentences, while the sequential models
have not been given parse information. Therefore,
it is unclear whether the hierarchical generaliza-
tion displayed by the tree-based models arose from
the tree-based model structure, from the parse in-
formation provided to the models, or both.
To disentangle these factors, we ran two fur-
ther experiments. First, we retrained the Tree/Tree
GRU but using uniformly right-branching trees (as
in (11b)) instead of correct parses (as in (11a)).
Thus, these models make use of tree structure but
6The lack of ambiguity in each training set means that the
generalization set becomes essentially another test set.
not the kind of parse structure that captures lin-
guistic information. Second, we retrained the se-
quential GRU without attention7 but modified the
input and output by adding brackets that indicate
each sentence’s parse; for example, (12a) would
be changed to (12b). Thus, these models are pro-
vided with parse information in the input but such
structure does not guide the neural network com-
putation as it does with tree RNNs.
(11) a.
my yak does giggle
.
b.
my
yak
does
giggle .
(12) a. my yak does giggle . QUEST
→ does my yak giggle ?
b. [ [ [ my yak ] [ does giggle ] . ] QUEST ]
→ [ [ does [ [ my yak ] giggle ] ] ? ]
We ran 100 instances of each experiment us-
ing different random seeds. For the experiment
with bracketed input, the brackets significantly in-
creased the lengths of the sentences, making the
learning task harder; we therefore found it neces-
sary to use a patience of 6 instead of the patience
of 3 we used elsewhere, but all other hyperparam-
eters remained as described in Appendix A.
For both tasks, neither the sequential GRU that
was given brackets in its input nor the Tree/Tree
model that was given right-branching trees dis-
played a hierarchical bias (Figure 9).8 The lack
of hierarchical bias in the sequential GRU with
bracketed input indicates that simply providing
parse information in the input and target output is
insufficient to induce a model to favor hierarchi-
cal generalization; it appears that such parse infor-
mation must be integrated into the model’s struc-
ture to be effective. On the other hand, the lack
of a hierarchical bias in the Tree/Tree model us-
ing right-branching trees shows that simply having
tree structure is also insufficient; it is necessary to
have the correct tree structure.
8 Will models generalize across
transformations?
Each experiment discussed so far involved a sin-
gle linguistic transformation. By contrast, humans
acquiring language are not exposed to phenomena
7We chose this sequential model because the Tree/Tree
model is also based on GRUs without attention.
8Providing the parse with brackets did significantly im-
prove the first-word accuracy of the sequential GRU, but this
accuracy remained below 50%.
Not provided Provided
correct parse correct parse
GRU ! 0.01 0.35
Tree/Tree ! 0.05 0.99
(a) Question formation generalization set results.
Not provided Provided
correct parse correct parse
GRU ! 0.04 0.00
Tree/Tree ! 0.07 0.94
(b) Tense reinflection generalization set results.
Figure 9: Disentangling tree structure and parse in-
formation. The GRU ! that is not provided the
correct parse is the same as GRU ! in Figures 4
and 8. The Tree/Tree model that is provided the
correct parse is the same as the Tree/Tree model in
Figures 7 and 8. The other two conditions are new:
The GRU ! that was provided the correct parses
was given these parses via bracketing, while the
Tree/Tree model that was not provided the correct
parses was instead given right-branching trees.
in isolation but rather to a complete language en-
compassing many phenomena. This fact has been
pointed to as a possible way to explain hierarchical
generalization in humans without needing to pos-
tulate any innate preference for hierarchical struc-
ture. While one phenomenon, such as question
formation, might be ambiguous in the input, there
might be enough direct evidence among other phe-
nomena to conclude that the language as a whole
is hierarchical, a fact which learners can then ex-
tend to the ambiguous phenomenon (Pullum and
Scholz, 2002; Perfors et al., 2011), under the non-
trivial assumption that the learner will choose to
treat the disparate phenomena in a unified fashion.
While our training sets are ambiguous with re-
spect to whether the phenomenon underlying the
mapping is structurally driven, they do contain
other cues that the language is more generally gov-
erned by hierarchical regularities. First, certain
structural units are reused across positions in a
sentence; for example, prepositional phrases can
appear next to subjects or objects. Such reuse of
structure can be represented more efficiently with
a hierarchical grammar than a linear one. Second,
in the question formation task, subject-verb agree-
ment can also act as a cue to hierarchical structure:
Ambiguous Ambiguous
question tense
formation reinflection
Single-task 0.01 0.04
Multi-task 0.09 0.17
+auxiliaries 0.01 0.99
Figure 10: Multi-task learning results for a GRU
without attention. Single-task reports baselines
from training on a single ambiguous task. Multi-
task reports results from adding an unambiguous
second task. Multi-task + auxiliaries reports re-
sults from adding an unambiguous second task and
also adding overt auxiliaries to the tense reinflec-
tion sentences. The numbers give the generaliza-
tion set performance on the ambiguous task.
e.g., in the sentence my walrus by the yaks does
read, the inflection of does depends on the verb’s
hierarchically-determined subject (walrus) rather
than the linearly closest noun (yaks).9
For the sequential RNNs we have investigated,
it appears that these indirect cues to hierarchical
structure were not sufficient to guide the mod-
els towards hierarchical generalizations. However,
perhaps the inclusion of some more direct evi-
dence for hierarchy would be more successful.
To take a first step toward investigating this pos-
sibility, we use a multi-task learning setup, where
we train a single model to perform both question
formation and tense reinflection. We set up the
training set such that one task was unambiguously
hierarchical while the other was ambiguous be-
tween the hierarchical generalization and the lin-
ear generalization. This gave two settings: One
where question formation was ambiguous, and
one where tense reinflection was ambiguous. We
trained 100 instances of a GRU without attention
on each setting and assessed how each model gen-
eralized for the task that was ambiguous.
For both cases, generalization behavior in the
multi-task setting differed only minimally from
the single-task setting (Figure 10). One potential
explanation for the lack of transfer across tasks
is that the two tasks operated over different sen-
tence structures: the question formation sentences
always contained overt auxiliaries on their verbs
9Subject-verb agreement does not act as a cue to hierarchy
in the tense reinflection task because all relevant sentences
have been withheld to maintain the training set’s ambiguity.
(e.g., my walrus does giggle), while the tense re-
inflection sentences did not (e.g., my walrus gig-
gles). To test this possibility, we reran the multi-
task experiments but with overt auxiliaries added
to the tense reinflection sentences (Figure 10,
“Multi-task + auxiliaries” row). In this setting,
the model still generalized linearly when it was
question formation that was ambiguous. However,
when it was tense reinflection that was ambiguous,
the model generalized hierarchically.
We hypothesize that the directionality of this
transfer is due to the fact that the question for-
mation training set includes unambiguous long-
distance subject-verb agreement as in (13), which
might help the model on generalization-set exam-
ples for tense reinflection such as (14):
(13) my zebras by the yak do read . DECL
→ my zebras by the yak do read .
(14) my zebras by the yak did read . PRESENT
→ my zebras by the yak do read .
By contrast, the tense reinflection training set does
not contain any outputs of the type withheld from
the question formation training set. If this ex-
planation is correct, it would mean that the im-
provement on the tense reinflection task derived
not from the question formation transformation
but rather from the subject-verb agreement inci-
dentally present in the question formation dataset.
Therefore, even the single potential case of gener-
alization across transformations is likely spurious.
Recent NLP work has also found that neural
networks do not readily transfer knowledge across
tasks; e.g., pretrained models often perform worse
than non-pretrained models (Wang et al., 2019).
This lack of generalization across tasks might be
due to the tendency of multi-task neural networks
to create largely independent representations for
different tasks even when a shared representation
could be used (Kirov and Frank, 2012). There-
fore, to make cross-phenomenon generalizations,
neural networks may need to be given an explicit
bias for sharing processing across phenomena.
9 Discussion
We have found that all factors we tested can qual-
itatively affect a model’s inductive biases but that
a hierarchical bias—which has been argued to un-
derlie children’s acquisition of syntax—only arose
in a model whose inputs and computations were
governed by syntactic structure.
9.1 Relation to Rethinking Innateness
Our experiments were motivated in part by the
book Rethinking Innateness (Elman et al., 1998)
which argued that humans’ inductive biases must
arise from constraints on the wiring patterns of the
brain. Our results support two conclusions from
this book. First, those authors argued that “Dra-
matic effects can be produced by small changes”
(p. 359). This claim is supported by our obser-
vation that low-level factors, such as the size of
the hidden state, qualitatively affect how models
generalize (Section 3.5). Second, they argued that
“[w]hat appear to be single events or behaviors
may have a multiplicity of underlying causes” (p.
359); in our case, we found that a model’s general-
ization behavior results from some combination of
factors that interact in hard-to-interpret ways; e.g.,
changing the type of attention had different effects
in SRNs than in GRUs.
The dramatic effects of these low-level factors
offer some support for the claim that humans’ in-
ductive biases can arise from fine-grained archi-
tectural constraints in the brain. However, this
support is only partial. Our only model that ro-
bustly displayed the kind of preference for hier-
archical generalization that is necessary for lan-
guage learning did not derive such a preference
from low-level architectural properties but rather
from the explicit encoding of linguistic structure.
9.2 Relation to human language acquisition
Our experiments showed that some tree-based
models displayed a hierarchical bias, while non-
tree-based models never displayed such a bias,
even when provided with strong cues to hierarchi-
cal structure in their input (through bracketing or
multi-task learning). These findings suggest that
the hierarchical preference displayed by humans
when acquiring English requires making explicit
reference to hierachical structure, and cannot be
argued to emerge from more general biases ap-
plied to input containing cues to hierarchical struc-
ture. Moreover, since the only successful hierar-
chical model was one that took the correct parse
trees as input, our results suggest that a child’s set
of biases includes biases governing which specific
trees will be learned. Such biases could involve in-
nate knowledge of likely tree structures, but they
do not need to; they might instead involve in-
nate tendencies to bootstrap parse trees from other
sources, such as prosody (Morgan and Demuth,
1996) or semantics (Pinker, 1996). With such in-
formation, children might learn their language’s
basic syntax before beginning to acquire question
formation, and this knowledge might then guide
their acquisition of question formation.
There are three important caveats for extending
our conclusions to humans. First, humans may
have a stronger bias to share processing across
phenomena than neural networks do, in which
case multi-task learning would be a viable expla-
nation for the biases displayed by humans even
though it had little effect on our models. Indeed,
this sort of cross-phenomenon consistency is sim-
ilar in spirit to the principle of systematicity, and it
has long been argued that humans have a strong
bias for systematicity while neural networks do
not (e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Lake and
Baroni, 2018). Second, some have argued that
children’s input actually does contain utterances
unambiguously supporting a hierarchical transfor-
mation (Pullum and Scholz, 2002), whereas we
have assumed a complete lack of such examples.
Finally, our training data omit many cues to hi-
erarchical structure that are available to children,
including prosody and real-world grounding. It is
possible that, with data closer to a child’s input,
more general inductive biases might succeed.
However, there is still significant value in study-
ing what can be learned from strings alone, be-
cause we are unlikely to understand how the multi-
ple components of a child’s input interact without
a better understanding of each component. Fur-
thermore, during the acquisition of abstract as-
pects of language, real-world grounding is not al-
ways useful in the absence of linguistic biases
(Gleitman and Gleitman, 1992). More gener-
ally, it is easily possible for learning to be harder
when there is more information available than
when there is less information available (Dupoux,
2018). Thus, our restricted experimental setup
may actually make learning easier than in the more
informationally-rich scenario faced by children.
9.3 Practical takeaways
Our results leave room for three possible ap-
proaches to imparting a model with a hierarchical
bias. First, one could search the space of hyper-
parameters and random seeds to find a setting that
leads to the desired generalization. However, this
may be ineffective: At least in our limited explo-
ration of these factors, we did not find a hyperpa-
rameter setting that led to hierarchical generaliza-
tion across tasks for any non-tree-based model.
A second option is to add a pre-training task or
use multi-task learning (Caruana, 1997; Collobert
and Weston, 2008; Enguehard et al., 2017), where
the additional task is designed to highlight hier-
archical structure. Most of our multi-task exper-
iments only achieved modest improvements over
the single-task setting, suggesting that this ap-
proach is also not very viable. However, it is pos-
sible that further secondary tasks would bring fur-
ther gains, making this approach more effective.
A final option is to use more interpretable archi-
tectures with explicit hierachical structure. Our re-
sults suggest that this approach is the most viable,
as it yielded models that reliably generalized hi-
erarchically. However, this approach only worked
when the architectural bias was augmented with
rich assumptions about the input to the learner,
namely that it provided correct hierarchical parses
for all sentences. We leave for future work an
investigation of how to effectively use tree-based
models without providing correct parses.
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A Architecture and training details
We used a word embedding size of 256 (with word
embeddings learned from scratch), a hidden size
of 256, a learning rate of 0.001, and a batch size
of 5. Models were evaluated on a validation set
after every 1000 training batches, and we halted
training if the model had been trained for at least
30,000 batches and had shown no improvement
over 3 consecutive evaluations on the validation
set (the number 3 in this context is called the pa-
tience). The training set contained 100,000 exam-
ples, while the validation, test, and generalization
sets contained 10,000 examples each. The datasets
were held constant across experiments, but mod-
els sampled from the training set in different or-
ders across experiments. During training, we used
teacher forcing on 50% of examples.
B Equations for squashing experiments
The equations governing a standard LSTM are:
it = σ(Wi ∗ [ht−1, wt] + bi) (1)
ft = σ(Wf ∗ [ht−1, wt] + bf ) (2)
gt = tanh(Wg ∗ [ht−1, wt] + bg) (3)
ot = σ(Wo ∗ [ht−1, wt] + bo) (4)
ct = ft ∗ ct−1 + it ∗ gt (5)
ht = ot ∗ tanh(ct) (6)
To create a new LSTM whose cell state exhibits
squashing, like the hidden state of the GRU, we
modified the LSTM cell state update in (5) to (7),
where the new coefficients now add to 1:10
ct =
ft
ft + it
∗ ct−1 + it
ft + it
∗ gt (7)
The equations governing a standard GRU are:
rt = σ(Wr[ht−1, wt] + br) (8)
zt = σ(Wz[ht−1, wt] + bz) (9)
h˜ = tanh(Wx[rt ∗ ht−1, wt] + bx) (10)
ht = zt ∗ ht−1 + (1− zt) ∗ h˜ (11)
The GRU’s hidden state is squashed because its
update gate z merges the functions of the input and
forget gates (i and f ) of the LSTM (cf. equations
5 and 11). As a result, the input and forget weights
are tied in the GRU but not the LSTM. To create a
non-squashed GRU, we added an input gate i and
changed the hidden state update (Equation 11) to
Equation 13 to make z act solely as a forget gate:
it = σ(Wi[ht−1, wt] + bi) (12)
ht = zt ∗ ht−1 + it ∗ h˜ (13)
10 We modified the structure of the gates rather than adding
a squashing nonlinearity to avoid vanishing gradients.
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